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REPLY POINT I
THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FIRST
IMPRESSION IN UTAH: IS A HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE
HELD TO A "REASONABLE PRUDENCE- OR A
"CUSTOMARY PRACTICE" STANDARD OF
CARE?
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT
"REASONABLE PRUDENCE."
A. Introduction
After reading Dr. Wilde's Brief it appears to appellant that resolution of
this appeal requires the Court to address a legal question of first impression in Utah:
whether a health care provider in a medical malpractice case is to be held to a
"reasonable prudence" or to a "customary practice" standard of care, viz., a standard
of care based solely on professional custom. A search of Utah malpractice cases reveals
that the issue has never been squarely dealt with by a Utah appellate court. The
national trend is the "reasonable prudence" standard and rejection of the "customary
practice" standard. This is an appropriate case for the Court to clearly rule on the
appropriate standard. Appellant invites the Court to adopt the "reasonable prudence"
standard and align Utah with the growing number of states which reject the customary
practice standard. Doctors should not be able to escape liability on the ground that they
follow custom when such custom is unreasonable and dangerous. Under "reasonable
prudence," the trial court'sfindingof safety in the case subjudice is clearly erroneous.
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B. Reasonable Prudence Test: Fair. SafeT
Logical and the Trend
Dr. Wilde advocates the antiquated, arbitrary and unjustifiable regime of
allowing custom to be the sole criteria in establishing the standard of care. Prosser
states that "[a]n increasing number of courts are rejecting the customary practice
standard in favor of a reasonable care or reasonably prudent doctor standard." W.
Prosser, Law of Torts Section 32 (5th ed. Supp.1988) (emphasis added).1 According
to Prosser, "proof of medical custom then becomes relevant to. but not conclusive on.
the issue of due care, consistent with the general tort law rule." Id. (emphasis added)
Discussing that general tort law rule Prosser states:
[Cjustoms and usages themselves are many and various; some are the
result of careful thought and decision, while others arise from the kind
of inadvertence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring [sic] and cornercutting that normally is associated with negligence. There can certainly
be such a thing as customary negligence, as the unchecked habit of
jaywalking in some communities may suggest.
Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to save time,
effort or money, cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled
standard. ... And if the only test is to be what has been done before,
no industry or group will ever have any great incentive to make progress
in the direction of safety. Cases will no doubt be infrequent in which
any defendant will be held liable for failing to do what no one in his
position has ever done before; but there appears to be no doubt that they
can arise. Much the better view, therefore, is that of the great majority
of the cases, that every custom is not conclusive merely because it is a
custom, that it must meet the challenge of "learned reason." and be given
only the evidentiary weight which the situation deserves, [footnotes
omitted] (emphasis added)
Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts, Ch. 5, Section 33, p. 194 (5th Ed. 1984).

This trend is exactly the opposite of how Dr. Wilde presents it.
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While appellant believes that the standard of care issue in this case is
truly one of first impression, there have been judicial expressions in Utah which appear
to favor the reasonable prudence standard. In opting for the "similar locality rule" over
the "same locality rule" the Utah Supreme Court in Swan v. Lamb. 584 P.2d 814 (Utah
1978) stated:
... it beggars the imagination to think a doctor in Salt Lake City could
escape responsibility for harm done to his patient by failing to remove
the substance [dye from spinal canal] merely because the local custom is
to leave the substance in the canal so that it will be absorbed by the
body. If this procedure is generally regarded to be unsatisfactory or
dangerous, no doctor should escape responsibility merely because the
local practice has not yet adopted it. (emphasis added)
Id. at 817, 818. And in Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981), Justice Stewart
stated:
In Swan v. Lamb, supra, this Court held that a doctor in Salt Lake City
should be held to the same standard of care as that which prevailed in
similar localities. It was observed that the "similar locality" rule is "but
a specialized application of the standard of conduct so universally
imposed by the law: of requiring the degree of care which the ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person would observe under the same or similar
circumstances." (Crockett, J., concurring specially, 584 P.2d at 819.)
(emphasis added)
Id. at 537.
Rivera asks this court to adopt the better standard of care in medical
malpractice actions of "reasonable prudence" and to reject the illogical, unsafe, and
unfair "customary practice" standard advocated by Dr. Wilde. The facts of this case
offer the court a prime opportunity to adopt the reasonable prudence standard because
the undisputed evidence established by expert testimony and authoritative medical
literature is that Dr. Wilde's customary practice standard is unsafe. Dr. Wilde's
3

standard is based solely on the considerations, discussed above by Prosser, of saving
time and effort, and making money. Appellant's Brief at 48-49.
C. Reasonable Prudence and Helling
Dr. Wilde mischaracterizes appellant's reasonable prudence position
(Appellant's Brief pp. 24-27) as advocating:
... a form of strict liability for physicians determined retrospectively on
an ad hoc basis. The Appellant's position would permit judges and juries
to create standards of care from their own expectation of medicine,
however high, rather than upon the testimony of medical experts. In
support of this proposition, the Appellant relies upon an obscure and
discredited decision, Helling v. Carey. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
Respondent's (hereinafter "Wilde's") Brief p. 22.

Dr. Wilde levels additional

disparaging remarks about Helling, implying that no one else follows it, the national
trends are against it and that it is limited to its facts. See Wilde's Brief pp. 22-24.
These are grossly inaccurate characterizations.
Helling belongs to that respected and well-established line of
jurisprudence which disallows establishment of professional standards of care based
solely upon negligent custom. In Helling, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
"reasonable prudence may require a standard of care higher than that exercised by the
relevant professional group." Gates v. Jensen. 595 P.2d919. 921 (Wash. 19791 Since
the undisputed medical testimony was that a simple and harmless pressure test would
detect the devastating disease of glaucoma, all nine justices agreed that the customary
practice of not administering the test to individuals under 40, based on the rareness of
the disease, was negligent as a matter of law. Helling at 983.
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D. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in the State of
Washington
Contrary to Dr. Wilde's assertions, Helling has been followed and
extended to all medical malpractice cases in the state of Washington; it has been directly
endorsed by name in several other jurisdictions; and is adhered to in principle by the
great majority of cases addressing the role of custom in establishing a legal standard of
care.

In Harris v. Groth. 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983), the Supreme Court of

Washington, En Banc, upheld the Helling decision and made clear that all health care
providers (not just ophthalmologists) in medical malpractice actions were to be held to
a standard of care of reasonable prudence and not the "average practitioner" standard.2
Id. at 116-118. See also Gates, supra and Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital. 622 P.2d
1246 (Wash. 1980).
Defendant's citation of the 1976 Washington Court of Appeals decision,
Meeks v. Marx. 550 P.2d 1158 (Wash. App. 1976), misstates the current status of the
law in Washington. See Wilde's Brief p. 24. The later decisions in Harris. Gates, and
Keogan3 (1983, 1979 and 1980) established that the court of appeals in Meeks
erroneously interpreted legislation as limiting Helling to "its own 'unique' facts."
2

In its opinion, the court explained the history of the legal standard of care to which health care
providers were held following the Helling decision. The court noted that Helling "aroused great controversy"
and that health care providers "fearing the worst ... sought aid from the Legislature in reversing what they
viewed as an unjustified judicial intrusion into health care." Id. at 116. The court then noted that several bills
were passed by the Washington Legislature and that the prevailing view among the commentators had been that
these bills were intended to overrule Helling and reestablish professional custom as the sole criteria in
determining the standard of care. Id- The Harris court, noting that this contention was in part rejected in Gates,
goes on to fully reject the idea that legislation had restored the customary practice standard.
3

Gates and Keogan. like Helling, have remarkable similarities to the case subjudice, and
plaintiff solicits the court's attention to them.
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Wilde's Brief p. 24. Dr. Wilde erred in not directing this court to the later cases by
a higher court. See fti 2, supra. Additionally, Richards v. Qverlake Hospital Medical
Center. 796 P.2d 737 (Wash. App. 1990) cited in support of points with which
appellant agrees, also affirms directly or indirectly, the holding in Helling. Helling,
contrary to Dr. Wilde's assertion of being emaciated, is alive, well, and thriving in the
State of Washington.

E. Helling and Reasonable Prudence in Other
Jurisdictions
Dr. Wilde claims Helling has remained in an "appropriate place of
obscurity in American jurisprudence," citing but one California appellate opinion.
Wilde's Brief p. 23. Dr. Wilde fails to note that Helling was cited favorably by another
California appellate court, Barton v. Owen. 71 Cal. App.3d 484, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494
(1977), and has been directly endorsed by name in at least the following cases:
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital. 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1984); George B.
Gilmore Co. v. Garrett. 582 So.2d 387 (Miss. 1991); Hall v. Hilbun. 466 So.2d 856
(Miss. 1985); Turner v. Children's Hospital. Inc.. 602 N.E.2d 423 (Ohio App. 1991);
and Hernandez v. Nueces County Medical Society Community Blood Bank. 779 S. W.2d
867 (Tex. App. 1989).
For example, in Hernandez a patient brought a negligence action against
a blood bank for failing to conduct surrogate tests which could indicate the presence or
likelihood of hepatitis. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment stating:

6

It is well-established that state health regulations, national standards, and
organizational bylaws are admissible to define the standard of care
customarily offered;
however, such evidence does not usually
conclusively establish that a health care provider fulfilled its duty of care
to its patients and it does not necessarily preclude a finding of
negligence. Golden Villa Nursing Home. Inc. v. Smith, 674 S.W.2d
343, 349 (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Rather, evidence of such standards performs the same function as does
evidence of custom, in that it is only one factor to consider when
determining good, prudent medical care. Cf. Helling v. Carey. 83
Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974).
Hernandez. 779 S.W.2d 781. Many other courts have followed the same reasonable
prudence doctrine adopted by Helling. See, for example, Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic,
P.A.. 375 N.W.2d 861 (Minn.App. 1985); McNeil v. U.S.. 519 F.Supp. 283 (D. Ct.
S. Carolina 1981); Incollingo v. Ewing. 282 A.2d 206 (Penn. 1971).
F. The Requirement of Medical Expertise to
Establish Reasonable Prudence
Defendant additionally mischaracterizes Appellant's Brief as asking this
court "to overturn decades of well-established case law" and substitute the wisdom of
judges and juries "for that of the medical community in determining how to
appropriately diagnose and treat a medical complication of pregnancy." Wilde's Brief
p. 21. Nothing could be further from the truth. Appellant whole-heartedly agrees with
Dr. Wilde's claims that medical expertise is generally required to establish the standard
of care. Appellant acknowledges that medical expertise was certainly required and
furnished in the case subjudice.
Dr. Wilde's misguided attack was obviously inspired by commentary
claiming that the Helling court had "unwisely ... arrogated to itself medical
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decisions...." King, 28 Vand.L.Rev. 1213, 1250 (1975). But the author of that article
conceded:
In thefinalanalysis, Helling rejected the professional standard as applied
to routine glaucoma testing and potentially rejected the professional
standard for other medical procedures as well, especially if the
procedures do not involve an extensive exercise of professional discretion
or judgment, [footnote omitted] (emphasis added)
Id. at 1248. Helling, like the Utah case of Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah
1980), was not a case where the reasonableness and safety of the act or omission was
"outside the common knowledge and experience of the layman." Id. at 352.
The Washington Court of Appeals has addressed fears expressed from
critics of Helling by stating:
The standard of care against which a health care provider is judged is
generally established by expert testimony. Douglas v. Bussabarger. 73
Wash.2d 476, 479, 438 P.2d 829 (1968). This requirement has evolved
to a standard of reasonably prudent medical care. Reasonably prudent
medical care is not within the knowledge of lay persons. Harris v.
Robert C. Groth. M.D.. Inc.. 99 Wash.2d 438, 449 n. 6, 663 P.2d 113
(1983). Thus, although the standard of care is not restricted to what is
actually practiced, it must be determined by reference to expert testimony
as to what is reasonably prudent, (emphasis added)
Richards, at 744-45. Thus, expert testimony is required, but customary practice is not
the sole criteria.
Dr. Wilde cites this same passage for the proposition that "Helling
notwithstanding, expert testimony is still necessary to establish whether a specific
treatment is 'reasonably prudent.'" No one disputes the point. Appellant introduced
extensive expert testimony and literature establishing the unsafeness and

8

unreasonableness of Dr. Wilde's customary practice standard of care. It would appear
that the only one being "haunted" by Helling is Dr. Wilde. Dr. Wilde's Brief p. 24.

REPLY POINT H
DR. WILDE'S RECITATION OF FACTS,
CITATION OF CASES AND CITATIONS TO THE
RECORD ARE INACCURATE AND UNRELIABLE.
MRS. RIVERA ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE VERDICT.
Many of Dr. Wilde's citations to the record are inaccurate.

They

misstate or omit significant portions of trial testimony and case law. The overall result
is that Dr. Wilde's Brief is seriously flawed, incomplete and unreliable.
A. Inaccurate Statement of Positions
Dr. Wilde states his position thusly: he followed an accepted "clinical
definition" for diagnosing preeclampsia, i.e., blood pressure of 140/90 plus proteinuria,
which is recognized by respected and competent obstetricians. Wilde's Brief, p. 11;
Wilde T. 1253. There was evidence at trial of this definition. However, Dr. Wilde's
entire Point I (Wilde's Brief, p. 7-18) is actually a misleading, "straw man" argument,
that incorrectly characterizes the issue on appeal as a dispute over "definitions."

This

case is not about the definition of preeclampsia! No one disputes defendant's argument
that an accepted school of thought "defines" preeclampsia as blood pressure of 140/90
(systolic over diastolic) with proteinuria.4

4

But does the lack of these symptoms

There also exists an accepted school of thought that defines preeclampsia as 140/90 plus
proteinuria or edema, or, as to blood pressure, an increase of 15 DBP or 30 SBP (diastolic and systolic) over
base line. Plaintiff presented with a 24 DBP increase and complaining of edema and thus was preeclamptic

9

necessarily mean the patient does not have preeclampsia, or is it safe to wait for these
symptoms to develop when the patient may have or be developing preeclampsia without
them? Explanation is in order.
By way of analogy, suppose a patient presents with bone protruding
through the skin of her arm and complaining of pain. There would be a presumptive
diagnosis of a broken arm. That is not difficult. However, while protruding bone
through the flesh presumptively indicates a diagnosis of broken arm, the lack thereof
doesn't necessarily mean that the arm isn't broken. If the arm is only swelling, it could
be a break or a sprain. Only an x-ray will tell. Another example: A bad cough could
be pneumonia, or something else.

Pneumonia can develop quickly, with fatal

consequences. Can the family doctor send the patient away for two weeks without a
warning or interim follow-up?
If a patient walks in the door and presents herself with a blood pressure
of 140/90 plus proteinuria, she has preeclampsia, by definition, and should be treated
accordingly. Everyone agrees. It is a presumptive diagnosis. The real issue here is:
can Dr. Wilde presumptively conclude Brenda does not have preeclampsia just because
she doesn't have blood pressure of 140/90 plus proteinuria? Can he schedule her next
appointment for two weeks away, when it is undisputed (and admitted by Dr. Wilde)
that some women have both preeclampsia and eclampsia without ever reaching 140/90
and without ever having proteinuria?

When these two conditions (140/90 plus

proteinuria) are the sine qua non of Dr. Wilde's "definition" and can undisputedly

under this definition.
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develop within days in a patient headed that direction, it can't be safe to have Brenda
come back in two weeks! Not having 140/90 or not having proteinuria does not
presumptively mean Brenda does not have or is not developing preeclampsia. Dr.
Wilde erred by so concluding. He erred when he concluded he could await the presence
of such symptoms before acting and that he could wait two weeks before the next visit.
He erred by not warning Brenda.
Appellant has proved that such a standard is unsafe because many women
may have preeclampsia, and even eclampsia, without ever having 140/90 and without
ever having proteinuria. A doctor can't wait for these bright-line criteria to develop,
when they may not show before the patient is seriously injured. Accordingly, it is
inaccurate and unfair for defendant to characterize appellant's position as a dispute over
the definition of preeclampsia.
B. Rivera Adequately Marshaled the Evidence
The defendant first claims that appellant failed to marshal "all the
evidence.M This ignores Point I.C of Appellant's Brief, pages 18 through 20, in which
appellant details six main categories covering all aspects of Dr. Wilde's evidence
on the only issue appellant challenges: The safety of Dr. Wilde's standard. The
arguments are fairly stated from Dr. Wilde's viewpoint. Each of the points is well
documented with citations to the record which allow a thorough review of the evidence.
For example, appellant referenced Dr. Wilde's testimony on 15 separate pages. R.
1253, 1255,1256, 1257,1258,1259, 1260,1270, 1293, 1294, 1309, 1313, 1314,1320
and 1321. Dr. Farnsworth's testimony is referenced on 10 different pages. R. 1116,
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1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1128, 1155, 1156, 1159 and 1160. There are also multiple
references to many pages. There is no need to be redundant.
Defendant then claims that appellant" s marshaling of the evidence is
insufficient because appellant failed to "separately setforth"the evidence which supports
each separate finding. Wilde's Brief at page 9. Defendant claims that Robb v.
Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993) requires this. To the contrary, this case
specifically held:
Here, appellant does not meet his marshaling burden. Instead, appellant
argues only selective evidence favorable to his position without
presenting the evidence supporting the trial court's finding: we therefore
affirm this finding, (emphasis added)
863 P.2d 1322 at 1327. Appellant is required only to "present the evidence" supporting
the finding; not to necessarily "separately" set the evidence forth. Dr. Wilde has
therefore inaccurately characterized the Robb holding.
Dr. Wilde ironically admits that the same evidence which supports the
court's Finding 10 also substantiates Finding ll. 5 Wilde's Brief at page 13. That's
appellant's point exactly. All of thefindingsthat Rivera challenges, in fact, deal with
basically one issue: whether Dr. Wilde's standard of care ("wait until she develops
140/90 and proteinuria") was "safe."

All the challenged findings are therefore

supported by the same body of evidence which Rivera broke down into six categories.
Thus, Rivera's marshaling of the evidence is adequate.

5

A further irony: Dr. Wilde's Brief complains on page 12 that defendant neglected to mention a
point "when she marshaled the evidence ..." This is an admission of sorts that plaintiff did marshal the
evidence.

12

C. Dr. Wade's Qualifications and Testimony
Dr. Wilde inaccurately recounts both Dr. Wade's qualifications and some
of his testimony.6 He claims that Rivera's "own expert," Dr. Maclyn Wade, agreed at
trial that Dr. Wilde's definition of hypertension was "consistent with an accepted school
of thought which is within the standard of care." Wilde's Brief at page 12. This is
a gross distortion of Dr. Wade's testimony, which was that hypertension could be
"defined" as any diastolic pressure over 90, but that if "rising pressures" are not
followed, "its not an option clinically that he [Wilde] can accept." Wade T. 1034: 25,
1035:1-3. Dr. Wade clearly disagreed on the record with defendant's position that "no
action" is an accepted option prior to the diastolic pressure reaching 90. Nor did Dr.
Wade agree that edema of the hands and face and weight gain are insignificant in the
diagnosis of preeclampsia, as represented by defendant on page 12 of his Brief. Wade
T. 921:21-26, 922, 923. While Dr. Wade admitted that there was such a school of
thought, he denied that it was "safe," stating, "... sure you can dismiss it. You can
do anything. But you can being [sic] dangerous for your patients too." Wade T. 10411042:6. To imply that Dr. Wade agreed that it was safe to dismiss the symptom of
edema misstates the record.
Elsewhere Dr. Wilde makes this astonishing claim about Dr. Wade:
All of the expert witnesses, including the Appellant's own, agreed that
the standard of care Dr. Wilde followed is recognized and accepted by

In a paradoxical lapse, Dr. Wilde ardently attacks Dr. Wade's credentials, while at the same
time citing his testimony favorably 8 times. Defendant's Brief, pp. 12 (Wade T. 1034, 1041, 1044), 17 (Wade
T. 1047, 1048, 1032) and 26 (Wade T. 1047 and 1048).
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competent and qualified obstetricians in this and similar communities
throughout the country.
Wilde's Brief, p. 20. Dr. Wilde provides no citation to the record, as required by the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, making it impossible to verify this claim. There
is, in fact, no portion of the record in which Dr. Wade agrees that Dr. Wilde followed
a recognized and accepted standard of care by having appellant wait until she developed
140/90 and proteinuria for treatment, or wait two weeks for her next appointment, or
not warn appellant of preeclampsia on her 6-15-89 visit. Instead, Dr. Wade stated again
and again, buttressed by volumes of undisputed literature, that although there is an
accepted "definition" of preeclampsia as blood pressure of 140 over 90 with proteinuria,
it is not safe nor accepted to await treatment until the symptoms reach that point,
because protein in the urine is a late-developing sign, and rising diastolic pressure alone,
even without protein in the urine, is dangerous to the mother and baby. Wade T. 856,
866, 904, 908, 912, 913, 914, 915, 972, 973, 974, 977, 1042: 21-25, 1043:1-11. Dr.
Wade certainly agreed with the presumptive definitions7 regarding preeclampsia and
hypertension, but he did not agree that Dr. Wilde's standard of waiting was safe.
On page 26 of his Brief, Dr. Wilde cites Dr. Wade's testimony in support
of the claim that swelling of the feet occurs in 80% of all pregnancies. The portion of
Dr. Wade's testimony cited (Wade T. 1047-8) contains no reference to this figure, nor
does Dr. Wilde's testimony establish this fact. Dr. Wilde's testimony was in reference
to an article in the medical literature which describes one study. Thus, the source of

140 SBP/90 DBP in the presence of proteinuria.
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this statistic is inaccurately presented, i.e., as having been proved with regard to ail
pregnancies, and that Dr. Wade was in agreement with the figure, which he was not.
In summary, Dr. Wade's testimony is seriously misstated.
Dr. Wilde also misstates Dr. Wade's experience in obstetrics. He claims
on page 14 of his Brief that Dr. Wade delivered only one or two babies a month during
his career. This statement is distorted because it is only true for the 1980-1989 period,
which was the end of Dr. Wade's active obstetrics practice, a fact not mentioned by
defendant. Wade T. 1028:13-14. It also omits the six years that Dr. Wade delivered
10-15 babies per month, Wade T. 842, and omits his participation in multiple deliveries
per day during part of his career. Id.8
Dr. Wilde also claims that Dr. Wade testified in "1500 depositions,"
Wilde's Brief, p. 14, when Dr. Wade's actual testimony was that he had given
"hundreds" of depositions. Wade T. 1023:6-11. In short, Dr. Wilde's portrayal of Dr.
Wade's qualifications and testimony is seriously flawed.
D. Dr. Wilde Quotes Medical Literature Out of Context
Wilde's Brief quotes important medical literature out of context omitting nearly all portions necessary for contextual understanding.9 The defendant
easily found literature that claims certain symptoms are not useful to diagnose

8

Credentials of Dr. Wade omitted by defendant include: Vice-chairman of the Department of
Obstetrics, University of California at Los Angeles for 6 years, and Director, Department of
Obstetrics/Gynecology, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, California, for 18 years. T. 841, Exhibit
15, p.3.
9

At trial, Dr. Wilde also brazenly quoted literature out-of-context. See examples in Appellant's
Brief, pps. 40-42.
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preeclampsia. Those same sources, however, also warn that while a patient may not
have reached the point of a presumptive diagnosis, the presence of these symptoms
warrants increased vigilance and cannot be safely ignored. This is the case with the
"bible" of obstetrics - Williams on Obstetrics - which Dr. Wilde claims supports his
case. Wilde's Brief at page 13. While Williams adopts the presumptive definition of
preeclampsia, it also warns against ignoring rising blood pressures in the later half of
pregnancy because it is "dangerous, to the fetus especially, not to take action simply
because proteinuria has not yet developed." (emphasis added)

Williams Obstetrics.

18th Ed., Cunningham, MacDonald & Gant, Appleton & Lange, 1989, p. 655 (Chapter
35 entitled "Hypertensive Disorders in Pregnancy,11 is attached as Appendix 1 to
Appellant's Brief). This contextual language is discussed at length in Appellant's Brief,
pps. 30-33.
Dr. Wilde's brazen quotation of Williams out of context is a microcosm
of the entire case. One gets an inaccurate picture by reading quotes out of context.
Clearly Williams does not support Dr. Wilde's position that there is a school of thought
that justifies inaction in the face of rising blood pressure such as experienced by Rivera
prior to her eclamptic seizures.
Dr. Wilde then claims on page 26 of his Brief that "the literature"
establishes that "73% of all women during perfectly normal pregnancies will
demonstrate a rise in blood pressure of at least 15 mm diastolic or 30 mm systolic."
Id. Dr. Wilde is relying on one article, for this claim-not upon multiple sources as
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implied. Indeed, Dr. Wilde seems to represent in his Brief that all literature supports
this finding, which is simply not true.
Again, on page 26 of his Brief, defendant claims that Rivera had no
proteinuria. This is true as of the time she last saw Dr. Wilde, but inaccurately
represents her ultimate condition, at the time of her convulsions. Rivera's case was not
one where she had no symptoms prior to fulmination of eclampsia as Dr. Wilde implies.
Instead at the time of her admission to the hospital, eight days after her last appointment
with Dr. Wilde, she had pitting edema of 3 +, protein in the urine of 4+ and extremely
high blood pressure of 206/112. See Trial Exhibit 1, page 91. All of these symptoms
could have been easily detected prior to the time Rivera fulminated, had she been
followed more closely.

Even Dr. Wilde's own expert witness, Dr. Farnsworth,

admitted that Brenda's proteinuria could have been detected prior to her convulsions if
she had been examined each day after her last visit on June 15th, 1989.

Dr.

Farnsworth's deposition testimony was read into the record as follows:
Mr. Sykes: 3, Line 8. [reading from the Dr. Farnsworth's deposition]:
"Do you agree that if Dr. Wilde had brought that patient in every day
from 6-15 on, at some point he likely would have found proteinuria?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did you read her medical records from the University of Utah
Hospital?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't it likely that he would have found that developing somewhere
along the line? At some time?
A. Yes, it is."
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Farnsworth T. 1188:25, 1189:1-13.
E. Erroneous Claim That Appellant Advocates Strict Liability
Dr. Wilde asserts that appellant is seeking to overturn the whole history
of Utah law with regard to medical malpractice. This is another straw-man argument.
On the contrary, Rivera seeks to present for the review of the court the largely
undisputed evidence regarding the unsafe nature of Dr. Wilde's claimed "school of
thought." There is no substantial evidence to support the court's finding that the school
of thought to which the Dr. Wilde adhered was safe. This was established at trial by
expert testimony and was well-supported by dozens of articles and book chapters from
learned medical literature, and by the defendant's own admissions.
Under Utah law the trier of fact determines the breach of defendant's
duty, and consequently, the applicable standard of care. Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d
1322, 1328 fn. 5 (Utah App. 1993) ("Utah courts have previously considered the issue
of negligence, or breach of a legal duty, to be a question of fact."). It is typical in a
medical malpractice case for the parties to be in disagreement over the standard of care.
The fact-finder must determine from the competing theories which standard of care is
established by the preponderance of evidence.10 If the evidence is insufficient to support
a finding, the verdict should be reversed. The trial court's finding of a safe standard
here is "clearly erroneous," based upon the undisputed, marshaled evidence. This is all
completely in conformance with well-established Utah law.

10

"No matter how arcane the subject matter or how erudite the witness, the jury is not required
to accept the expert's testimony as conclusive. The jurors may give such testimony any weight they choose,
including no weight at all." Dixon v. Stewart. 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)
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Defendant further alleges that appellant is urging the court to adopt strict
liability for medical practitioners. Not true! She does, however, urge the court to
examine the safety of a custom that allows a woman with signs and symptoms of
preeclampsia to go unmonitored for a long period of time, while waiting for a latedeveloping sign (proteinuria) before her obstetrician takes any action. The alternative
to this dangerous custom is not strict liability, but is a requirement that a woman with
a 24-point spike in the diastolic blood pressure, a spike in weight gain, and complaints
of edema, be warned of the signs and symptoms of preeclampsia so that she can be
aware of developing problems, and that the obstetrician monitor the woman's condition
until the blood pressure returns to normal, or until the patient develops further signs of
the disease justifying hospitalization. This is a far cry from strict liability.
Dr. Wilde incorrectly alleges that appellant would require obstetricians
to monitor two-thirds of all their patients every six hours during the entire last trimester
of their pregnancies. Wilde's Brief at 26. Nonsense. First of all, defendant's statistic
of two-thirds of all patients having this blood pressure is contrary to his own figure of
35%. Dr. Wilde surveyed his own patients and found that 35% showed a rise in blood
pressure of 15 diastolic or 30 systolic. Wilde T. 1263. But note: Brenda Rivera had
a 24-point DBP increase. Dr. Wilde himself thought she had preeclampsia when he
walked into the examination room that day. Wilde T. 1297-8. Interestingly, Dr. Wilde
provides m statistics for patients who have a 24-point increase in diastolic pressure,
with an 8-pound weight gain in V/i weeks, on which he initially suspected
preeclampsia. Such a figure would probably be significantly lower.
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It should hardly be a burden for Dr. Wilde, as a well-paid obstetrician,
to monitor the few patients he believes may be developing preeclampsia. He testified
that he did 20-25 deliveries per month. If he charged $1,200 for each delivery, he
would gross $24,000 - $30,000 per month just from the obstetric practice, not to
mention the gynecological practice.

It shouldn't be difficult to afford sufficient

personnel to monitor the blood pressure and protein of the few patients that Dr. Wilde
originally believes may be preeclamptic.
Second, the risk factors which were operating in Brenda Rivera's case
must be reviewed to show that she was not just like two-thirds, or even one-third of all
of defendant's obstetrical patients. In thefirstplace, as pointed out above, Brenda, had
a 24-point spike in diastolic blood pressure-something far more serious than a rise of
just 15 points. In addition, Brenda had an 8-pound weight gain and edema, two factors
which combine to make her situation different from the studies of blood pressures alone.
He initially suspected preeclampsia. Furthermore, Brenda's prenatal questionnaire
indicated that she had a family history of vascular disease because of her mother's high
blood pressure and a sister who had a stroke. Had Dr. Wilde made some inquiries, he
could have determined that Brenda's sister was hospitalized for pregnancy-induced
hypertension. Exhibit 39. Brenda was not a low-risk patient, as admitted by the
defendant himself and his expert:
Q. (By Mr. Sykes) Would that [family history, in Exhibit 39] justify
putting that person in a higher risk category?
A. Yes.
Q. Sure would. That wouldn't be a low risk case would it?
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A. (No response)
Q. Would it?
A. Well, there again, you said higher risk category. I think your index
of concern would go up some, whether it's a high risk or not, I can't
quantify that.
Q. What about intermediate risk?
A. She's someone that you would certainly want to watch closely.
FarnsworthT. 1138, 1139:10-23.
In addition, preeclampsia is almost entirely a disease of the first
pregnancy. Williams Obstetrics at 656. Appendix 1 (Appellant's Brief); Wade T. 875:2
This is another factor which set Brenda apart from many of Dr. Wilde's other prenatal
patients. Obviously not all of Dr. Wilde's patients were pregnant for the first time-in
fact, probably a significant percentage are not primigravidas (first pregnancy). Because
of this, those patients would not require the close monitoring that Brenda required
because of her family history, her status as a high risk patient and her status as a
primigravida.
Finally, consider the de minimis requirements for "monitoring." The
main factors in Dr. Wilde's own "definition" are extremely easy to monitor or even
self-monitor. The Smiths grocery stores have blood pressure cuffs at the pharmacy
counter. Dip sticks for detecting protein in urine are inexpensive. All Dr. Wilde had
to do is tell Brenda to come back a day or two later so that his nurse could check the
blood pressure and urine, perhaps a 3 minute job. He wouldn't even have to see her.
Surely, at least that was called for by the undisputed evidence.
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Dr. Wilde's "scare tactics" in which a huge percentage of patients would
have to be constantly monitored by Utah's obstetricians is a gross exaggeration.
F. Conclusion
In conclusion, Dr. Wilde's inaccurate statements and portrayals of the
record and case law are numerous and serious. They present a seriously flawed and
unreliable picture of the evidence at trial.

REPLY POINT III
DR. WILDE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF
SAFETY. IT IS NOT SAFE TO WAIT FOR
PROTEINURIA OR A 140/90 BLOOD PRESSURE
BEFORE TAKING ACTION TO PROTECT A
PATIENT.
The venerable legal principle of "estoppel by silence" holds that estoppel
"arises where [a] person is under duty to another to speak or failure to speak is
inconsistent with honest dealings." Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed. p. 1239 (West
Publishing Company 1979). English novelist Robert Louis Stevenson once said "the
crudest lies are often told in silence. " n
Dr. Wilde utterly ignores the safety issue because his position, from the
standpoint of safety, is indefensible. The entirety of Appellant's Brief is devoted to the
proposition that Dr. Wilde's bright-line standard for diagnosing preeclampsia is unsafe
because many women can develop preeclampsia or eclampsia without ever having
proteinuria or a blood pressure of 140/90. A vast body of evidence shows that between
11

From Truth of Intercourse.
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10% and 20% of preeclamptic women never have proteinuria. Appellant's Brief, pp.
28-32. Yet in the face of this "accusation" of "unsafe," Dr. Wilde's response is
tantamount to silence. Dr. Wilde never demonstrates any evidence that his standard is
"safe." His only response is that appellant failed to marshal the evidence and that local
custom supports his clinical definition. In fact, Dr. Wilde uses some derivation of the
word "safe" only five or six times in the entire brief (Wilde's Brief, pp. 13, 15, 21, 22
and 25), but, in each instance, he is merely quoting or repeating the court's Finding 11.
Dr. Wilde's lack of attempt to prove a "safe" standard is strange in the face of
appellant's claim of insufficiency of evidence to support that Finding. Furthermore, Dr.
Wilde never responds to Rivera's argument that he employs a "research definition,"
which provides only a "presumptive diagnosis." Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-40. There
is no response but silence to Rivera's challenge that a doctor can't wait for 140/90 plus
proteinuria before he acts. Dr. Wilde's failure to deal with this issue is an admission
that his position is indefensible.

REPLY POINT IV
DR. WADE WAS WELL QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY
AND HIS TESTIMONY WAS WELL-SUPPORTED
BY THE MEDICAL LITERATURE.
Contrary to Defendant's claims, Dr. Wade was well-qualified to testify
regarding the standard of care with regard to preeclampsia. Dr. Wade had been a fulltime instructor at Yale University for six years. Wade T. 840, 841. He was a
professor of obstetrics at U.C.L.A. for 19 years. Wade T. 841. He delivered 10-15
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babies per month while at Yale, Wade T. 842, and one to two babies per month while
at U.C.L.A., while also participating in numerous deliveries each day in his role as
instructor. Wade T. 843. He testified that he had treated numerous patients with
severe pregnancy complications including hypertension and eclamptic convulsions.
Wade T. 844. Dr. Wade was head of the department of Obstetrics at Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center for 19 years, and supervised the residents there. Any problem with a
pregnant patient at that hospital was immediately referred to him for consultation, or to
the one other professor there. Wade T. 846. Dr. Wade was chair of the Medical
Quality Review Committee of the Medical Board of California whose purpose was to
insure quality of medical care. Wade T. 846. The Committee acts as judge and jury
in questions of licensing and malpractice. Wade T. 847. With such qualifications and
experience, it is no wonder that upon concluding his career as an active obstetrician,
Dr. Wade is in demand as an expert witness.
Dr. Wade's testimony was well-supported by the medical literature which
warns of the dangers of rising blood pressure and the necessity of close monitoring
when diastolic blood pressure rises in conjunction with edema and weight gain.
Citations to the record where Dr. Wade read from 28 separate learned treatises in the
medical literature are found at page 41 in Appellant's Brief. The literature makes it
clear why the appellant's position is the only tenable standard of care for Utah: to wait
for proteinuria is to wait for a symptom which may never occur. Dr. Wilde would
allow a diagnosable condition to go untreated simply for the convenience of a busy
practitioner who needs "cutoffs" to practice "triage" with a large practice.
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Finally, Dr. Wade's testimony is buttressed by the many important
admissions of the defendant and his expert, Dr. Farnsworth, that preeclampsia and
eclampsia can occur without the presence of proteinuria.

These admissions are

discussed at pp. 30 and 31 of Appellant's Brief. The most important aspects of
appellant's evidence are uncontested, and therefore cannot be dismissed even if Dr.
Wade's testimony is found to be unpersuasive.

The evidence admitted by Dr.

Farnsworth and Dr. Wilde cannot be ignored, and has serious, far-reaching implications
for the women of Utah. Because Dr. Wade was well qualified to testify, because his
testimony was well-supported by the medical literature, and because the defendant and
his expert agreed upon key points that support the appellant's case, the defendant's
position is clearly erroneous and unsafe.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Undisputed evidence, corroborated by defendant and his expert, Dr.
Farnsworth as well as all of the medical literature, establishes that pregnant women may
develop preeclampsia and eclampsia without ever having proteinuria and without ever
having a blood pressure of 140/90. It is unsafe for Dr. Wilde to wait for something
that may never occur before he treats, monitors or warns about this life-threatening
condition. Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that Dr.
Wilde's standard was safe just because the presumptive diagnosis definition is accepted
by other doctors and other doctors may practice Dr. Wilde's unsafe standard.
Accordingly, this case should be reversed and remanded.
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DATED this 31st day of March, 1994.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Reply Brief was served upon the parties at the addresses listed below, by
hand delivery on the 31st day of March, 1994.
Mr. Elliott J. Williams
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
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